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Private  equity  funds  of  funds  (FOFs) have  become  big  business.   Today,  FOFs  form  14%  of new money 
raised.  I test six explanations for why limited partners (LPs) might use FOFs.  First, I find that FOFs do not 
generally deliver superior returns.   They do, however, perform well enough  for  the  limited partners  (LPs) 
that hire them.  Second, FOFs allow small LPs to scale upward, to invest in more funds.  However, I find that 
they do not contribute to diversification.  What they really do is to provide smaller LPs a way to lower the 
cost of fund management.   Third, FOFs allow  large LPs to scale downward, to  invest vast amounts over a 












Private equity  funds of  funds  (FOFs) have become big business.   Their number  tripled over  the  last  three 














3. FOFs  help  big  LPs  in  downward  scaling,  so  that  these  LPs  can  ramp  up  their  private  equity 
investments quickly?   Downward scaling can also mean that  large LPs can collapse many tedious 
fund‐level  approvals  into  an  umbrella  approval  for  a  FOF,  by  giving  the  latter  discretionary 
authority.   Finally,  the LPs do not have  to build enormous capacity during  the sparse  investment 
points and capital calls, only to have the capacity underutilized at other times3. 
4. LPs with weaker governance structures use FOFs to shoulder the blame in case of bad performance?  












These  explanations  need  not  be  exclusive,  or  even  exhaustive.   The  first  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to 
document  rigorous  tests of  these explanations  for  this burgeoning but  largely unexplored part of  finance, 
adding  to  the work of Gompers and Metrick  (2001)  for  institutional  funds and others  for various  types of 





resolving  a  number  of  errors.   Also, unlike previous  studies  (with  the prominent  exception  of Cochrane 
(2001)), I correct for selection bias in my estimations.   This is a problem pointed out by Kaplan and Schoar 
(forthcoming).  The second contribution of the paper is to articulate how the empirics shed light on theories 
of  financial  intermediation,  organizational  boundaries,  and  agency mechanisms.   These  contributions  are 
really more modest than they sound, because with such a broad sweep, this paper cannot be deep.  The plan 
is to use the data assembled for this paper as a platform for deeper inquiry in the future. 
But  first, a word on how  I define an FOF  in  this paper.    I define  it broadly,  to  include any  fund  that  its 
manager calls an FOF and whose manager is not also the LP4.  Therefore, I exclude activities of advisors or 





are  set up  like  regular VC  funds,  except  that  they  invest  in  funds  rather  than operating  companies.   An 








Each of  the explanations outlined earlier –  returns, downward and upward scaling, governance,  learning, 
and  booms  –  can  draw  upon  a  rich  set  of  theories.    My  focus  is  on  highlighting  where  theories  offer 
conflicting predictions, so that this paper can shed light on them using the FOF setting. 
Returns 
Lerner,  Schoar  and  Wong  (2004)  show  that  advisors  do  better  than  most  other  types  of  LPs,  except 
endowments (see their Table 3).  Their unit of analysis is the LP who invests in funds, of which one type is 
“advisors.”  If  this  includes  FOFs,  then  their  study  suggests  that  FOFs  offer  potentially  high  returns.  
However, my  focus  is  not  on  LPs who might  be  FOFs,  but  LPs who use  FOFs.    Indeed,  there  are  three 
perspectives of how to compare FOF performance, each answering a distinctive research question.  The first 










from  their  FOF  portfolios  than  their  non‐FOF  portfolios.    The  exceptions  are  those  FOF‐users  who  are 
already good  fund selectors –  i.e.,  their non‐FOF portfolios compare well with  the portfolios of non‐users.  
This suggests that, to a select clientele of LPs, FOFs do deliver value. 
Where might superior returns come  from?   One possibility  is a size effect.   Or perhaps FOFs, as boutique 
shops, could better attract and retain talent.  In particular, they have people who have more experience and 
the relationships to gain superior access to better funds?  As suggested by Hardymon, Lerner, Leamon and 
Angella  (2003), better access  could also  arise because GPs prefer FOFs because  the  latter need  less hand‐
holding,  unlike  inexperienced  LPs,  and  they  do  not  require GPs  to  fill  bulky  questionnaires,  unlike  the 
gatekeepers  so  often  engaged  by  pension  fund  investors.    Finally,  could  FOFs  garner  superior  returns 
because, unbeknownst to LPs, they simply take more risks? 
  5
What do  theories predict, and what do  I  find?     Starting with size, a good place  to start  is  to consider  the 
theories on mutual  fund performance.    In  that  literature,  the size effect has many views.   One  is  that size 
offers economies of scale.   But size can  limit the ability of a money manager to make  large trades, with  its 
attendant  impact on price and  liquidity, as pointed out by Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik  (forthcoming).  
Grinblatt  and  Titman  (1989)  find  that  size  has  an  overall  negative  impact.    Like  Kaplan  and  Schoar 







experienced staff.   This might account  for  their generally negative performance.    In  terms of access, FOF‐
using LPs are less skilled than non‐users.   Looking at the former’s FOF and non‐FOF portfolios, I find that 











help  LPs  move  right.    The  second  question  is  in  moving  up  –  i.e.,  conditional  on  a  desired  level  of 
diversification, LPs can be smaller to achieve minimum scale. 
The diversification issue has been heavily studied in the context of mutual funds.   The received wisdom is 
that  retail  investors  can diversify  by  themselves without  overly  high  transaction  costs,  so  diversification 
cannot be a motive  for  investment or  fund premium.   Cumby and Glen  (1990) show  this  for  international 
funds.    Indeed,  there  is  an  argument  for  not  diversifying,  so  that  fund  managers  can  maximize  their 
  6
informational advantage in narrow sectors.  Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2004) look at mutual funds from 
1984  to 1999 and  find  that controlling  for other effects, concentration helps performance  in a risk‐adjusted 
sense. 





reduction  explanation  can  also  be  cast  in  terms  of  outsourcing,  analogous  to  the  case  for mutual  funds, 
studied  by  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1997)  and  Chen,  Hong  and  Kubik  (2004).    They  suggest  three  more 
predictions.   First, FOF‐using LPs, as principals, must have  the  tool  to ensure  that FOFs as agents  indeed 
exert  the  appropriate  amount  of  effort.    That  tool  is  high‐powered  incentives.    In my  case,  the  specific 
prediction is that the use of FOFs would increase the chance of an LP not investing in a follow‐on FOF in the 
same  series  for poor performance,  a  test  suggested  by Lerner,  Schoar  and Wong  (2004).   This  sensitivity 
should  be  skewed  more  toward  poor  performance.    Second,  if  FOFs  operate  under  higher‐powered 
incentives,  they should  take  less risk, since effort  is unobservable but poor performance  is.   Third,  if FOFs 
take  less risk, they ought to get  lower return, assuming a reasonably efficient market.   This  last prediction 
does not contradict the earlier one which says that I expect higher returns for FOF‐usage, because that is after 
controlling for risks. 
I  find  that  LPs  do  use  higher‐powered  incentives  for  FOFs.    Specifically,  LPs’  reinvestment  decisions  in 




need  to  ramp  up  its  private  equity  investments.    The  peculiarity  of  the  situation  is  that  working  with 
multiple  FOFs might  increase  the  chance  of  these  FOFs  battling with  each  other,  using Calper’s money 
among  themselves,  to  invest  in  the  same  portfolio  company.    Theories  on  vertical  restraints  inform  this 
problem, which is often identified with the lack of coordination and free riding among distributors.   There 
are standard  industrial organization prescriptions,  the most common of which  is  to  reduce  the number of 






the market.   The FOF setting offers an  interesting one  to see how the empirics turn out, since  this  issue of 
rushing  out  large  quantities  through  exclusive  agents might  be  increasingly  important  in  a world where 
product lifecycles are shortening.  I find empirical support for this tradeoff mechanism. 
Downward  scaling  can  also mean  that  LPs  use  FOFs  so  that  they  can  collapse many  tedious  fund‐level 
approvals  into  an  umbrella  approval  for  FOFs  given  discretionary  authority.    This  is  reminiscent  of  the 
Grossman and Hart (1986) argument that ownership of assets and residual rights should optimally be in the 
hands  of  the  party  that  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  capabilities  (in  this  case,  in  moving  fast).    By 
outsourcing to FOFs, LPs also do not have to build enormous capacity during the sparse investment points 
and  capital  calls,  only  to  have  the  capacity  underutilized  at  other  times.      Both  of  these  are  efficiency 
arguments, and are covered in the previous discussion on outsourcing.  Therefore, I do not repeat any testing. 
Governance 






LPs  might  also  use  FOFs  as  stepping  stones  into  less  familiar  investment  areas.    A  common  learning 
mechanism  is  to  insist  on  co‐investment  rights  when  signing  up  the  FOF.    For  example,  Grove  Street 
Advisors agree  to  let Calpers  invest alongside GSA’s  investments, and  in stages, reduce  the proportion of 
investment by GSA‐managed funds and increase that of Calpers’ direct investment into identified portfolio 
companies.    I do not have detailed  information about  co‐investment arrangements.   However,  if  learning 
were an explanation, I should see that FOF‐using LPs tend to be those who are younger or are newer to the 
area  of  investing.    I  use  an  SUR  (seemingly  unrelated  regression)  estimation  to  control  for  the  many 





So  far,  I  have  not  incorporated  FOF performance  into  the  learning model.   A different prediction  of  the 
learning explanation is that FOF‐using LPs in say, venture capital, tend to increase their commitment to the 
same investment scope after a short positive experience with FOFs.  Figure 5 shows how the learning versus 









I  find  stronger  support  for  the performance  story, although again,  there  is weak  support  for  the  learning 
story for specialized areas. 
Temporary or Cyclical Phenomenon 
There  is a  final explanation  I  can  think of  to explain  the  rise of FOFs.   They could be popular  in  the  last 
decade because of the economic boom.  I find support for this too. 














Fourth,  from  Private  Equity  Intelligence,  I  obtain  a  dataset  with  profiles  of  funds,  GPs,  LPs,  and  the 
relationships among theses.   Importantly, PEI has internal rates of return (IRRs) for 1,782 funds, which are 
said to be cross‐checked between reporting by LPs and GPs.  Although I have only IRR as the single measure 






Sixth,  I manage  to  get  IRR  and  fund  profiles  direct  from  a  number  of  LPs,  and  hand‐coded  these.    The 
following have IRR information: (1) the University of Michigan endowment, (2) CalPERS, (3) California State 
Teachersʹ Retirement  System,  (4) Colorado  PERA,  (5) Orange County  Employees Retirement  System,  (6) 
Regents of  the University of California,  (7) UTIMCO,  (8) Washington State  Investment Board,  (9) Oregon 
Public  Employeesʹ  Retirement  Fund,  (10)  Ohio  Public  Employees  Retirement  System,  (11)  Pennsylvania 
Public  School Employees’ Retirement  System,  (12)  Idaho Public Employees Retirement  System5,  and  (13) 
Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.   The others have only fund  information,  including  their commitments 
and amount drawn down.   Among  them, about  two dozen have fairly complete and detailed  lists of  their 
investments.6  The primary ones are  the National Association of College and University Business Officers 








Public  Employees  Retirement  System,  (12)  Los  Angeles  City  Employeesʹ  Retirement,  (13)  Massachusetts  Pension 
Reserves  Investments,  (14)  Minnesota  State  Board  of  Investment,  (15)  NACUBO,  (16)  New  York  State  Teachersʹ 
Retirement  System,  (17) Norsk  Vekst  Forvaltning.,  (18) Oregon  State  Treasury,  (19) Oregon University  System,  (20) 
Pennsylvania  State  Employeesʹ  Retirement,  (21)  San  Diego  County  Employees  Retirement,  (22)  Virginia  Retirement 
System.  I also obtain information from about 40 other LPs, but they have spotty information.  Examples are the Hewlett 
Foundation,  the Connecticut Treasury,  the European  Investment Fund,  and  the Kern County Employees’ Retirement 
Association. 
  10
to confirm what  I got  from  the other sources or  to obtain updates or new  information.   From another 400 
plus websites of  these similar entities and  those of  third‐parties such as magazines, books, reports, and 44 
HBS cases and teaching notes, I find information such as whether two funds belong to the same GP under 
different names. 









Table  2 does not, however,  show  the qualitative  improvements  in  the dataset.   Scrubbing using multiple 
sources and  the visual  inspection of each observation  turns out  to be  important because each non‐original 
source has its share of errors or issues to resolve.  For example, some of these are due to different reporting 
times  (I  take  the  latest) and others  to coding errors  (e.g.,  fund’s closing date does not match with vintage 
year).   Conversely, some funds have the same label but are really different.   For example, there are several 
entries  for  an  “Allstate  Insurance  Co.”  fund,  but  one  was  started  in  1958  and  another  1987.    Using 
discriminating information such as vintage and size, I identify these distinctive entities. 
The  trickiest  is  the  IRR  information,  since  the differences are mostly genuine – LPs  could enter  the  same 
funds at different times, often producing dramatically different IRRs.  This is highlighted by a stinging letter 
from HTMF (Hicks Muse Tate & Furst, a GP) to its LPs and the Financial Times for reporting CalPERS’ return 














heterogeneity  in  the  type of FOF used, captured by  the rather awkward “maximum number of LPs  in  the 
FOF.”    Say  an LP  invests  in  several  FOFs.   Each  FOF may draw money  from  any  number  of LPs.   The 
“maximum number of LPs  in  the FOF”  is  the maximum of  this  last,  for an LP’s FOF.   LPs who use only 
captive FOFs would have this equal to 1.  Among FOF‐using LPs, the mean is 2 LPs in their FOFs. 






have  asset management  skills  and  contacts  as good  as most  FOFs’.    It  is  less  obvious why non‐financial 
corporations  (which  include corporate pension  funds) use FOFs  less – perhaps  they are  too small  to be of 
interest  to FOFs, or perhaps  the non‐pensions among  them are corporate venturing LPs who prefer direct 
investments of strategic  interests.   Educational  institutions  tend to use more.   This  is somewhat surprising 
because  education  institutions  tend  to  be performance‐oriented,  hinting  that  FOFs deliver  value  to  some 
types of LPs.  Interesting, some FOFs are LPs themselves, who in turn invest in FOFs.  However, this is rare. 
Sixth, in terms of usage by geography, FOFs are used slightly more in the Americas than elsewhere.  This is 
to  be  expected  if we  believe  that  the  fund management  business  is more  developed  in  the  former.    For 
American LPs, usage has only slight variation by state location, at least among the states with the most LPs. 
















numbers  for FOFs  suggest, but do not conclusively  imply,  that FOFs  run “out of  fashion”  less  frequently 




IRR  for  FOFs  is  lower  than  that  for  non‐FOFs.    I  also  calculate  “excess  IRRs,” which  are  IRRs  from  the 
benchmark  IRR of  funds grouped by:  (1) vintage,  (2)  stage  (e.g.,  early versus mezzanine),  (3),  investment 
scope  (e.g., venture capital versus distressed debt), and  (4) continent  (e.g., Americas versus Europe).   The 
means of excess IRRs exhibit the same pattern. 









larger than the $18.0 billion average  in the LP‐fund dataset  in Lerner, Schoar and Wong (2004).   The other 






fund dataset earlier  shows a  size bias, with a  larger mean here  ($792 million) versus  there  ($239 million).  





any  IRR disclosed  for a LP‐fund  is specific  to  the LP due  to  the LP’s  timing of entry  into  the  fund.   Since 
Private Equity  Intelligence’s  fund  IRRs are at  the  level of  the  fund,  I  check  if LP‐specific  returns are any 











Recall  that  I propose  three perspectives  for  looking at FOF  returns, each answering a distinctive  research 
question.  The first is to compare FOFs with other types of funds.  The second is to compare with other types 
of LPs.  The third is to compare between FOF‐users and non‐users, rather than between funds or LP types. 
1  – Comparing  FOFs with Other  Funds.   To  answer  the  first  question,  I  compare  fund  returns  under  a 
number of controls.   To control  for scale differences,  I use  fund size and sequence numbers.   Kaplan and 
Schoar (forthcoming) show that these can have quadratic relationships.  They also control for risk using an 
indicator for venture capital (VC) funds.  In Table 6, Model (1) is my replication of their main result in their 









(US),”  should  be  considered  the  same  GP.    The  answer  depends  on  how  3i  organizes  itself,  which  is 
information  that  is  difficult  to  obtain  for  all  GPs.    By  inspecting  the  4,849  corporate  names,  location, 
investment, scope, and vintage, I am able to hand‐code two distinct variables: one that classify GPs broadly 
at  the  holding  group  level  (GPglobalID)  and  another  at  the  local  organizational  level  (GPlocalID).    This 
distinction  also  happens  when  a  GP  morphs,  say  after  acquisitions,  from  “Adler  &  Co.”  to  “Adler  & 




However,  I am concerned about  two kinds of sample selection bias.   The first, pointed out by Kaplan and 
Schoar  (forthcoming),  is  that GPs might  selectively  stop  or  start  reporting  IRRs.    I  repeat  their  test,  by 
regressing the presence of the IRR for a fund on the IRRs for previous funds in the sequence by the same GP.  
Like  them,  I  find a positive coefficient on  the  IRR of  the previous  fund, so bias  is a concern.   The second 
source of bias  is  that Private Equity Intelligence might be more  likely  to get  IRRs  from bigger  funds, more 
recent funds, funds that invest bigger amounts (so these are likelier to show up in the media), or funds in the 
major centers  (California or Massachusetts) or where PEI has offices (Pennsylvania and London).   Table 7, 





        β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 




I  have  thus  far  relied  on  the  controls  in Kaplan  and  Schoar  (forthcoming).   But  I  can  use more  specific 
controls  –  such  as  various  stages  of  funds  rather  than  just  an  indicator  for  VCs  –  and  indicators  for 
geographic regions and investment scope.  Also, besides sequence number, I can use another instrument for 
risk, which is the average amount per round for each fund.  Finally, I add a variable for fund vintage. 




NASDAQ.    They  are  also  repeated  with  the  smaller  pre‐1999  dataset.    The  results  are  qualitatively 
unchanged and not reported here. 
2 – Comparing FOFs with Other LPs.   While these negative performances of FOFs  look discouraging,  it  is 
only  from  the perspective of an average LP.   But LPs are different, and  I next address  the second way of 
looking at FOF returns: compare if FOFs are able to pick funds better than some LPs.  Table 8 starts with the 
specification  in Lerner, Schoar and Wong  (2004),  in Model  (1)9.   The  results are qualitatively  the  same as 
theirs.    The more  significant  coefficients  are  for  educational  institutions  and  foundations,  and  these  are 
positive. 
For  the previous reasons, I once again employ a Heckman correction.    I  first build  the selection model.   A 
suggestion of how selection works in the dataset is in Table 7, panel (b).  It shows that the distribution of LP 




      β5.USorUKindicator + Σβ6.LPtypeIndicators  + β7.Log(LPsize) + ε 
Table 8, Model (2), shows the Heckman corrected estimation.  The inverse Mill’s ratio is large and significant, 
confirming that there is sample selection bias.  More coefficients for LP types are now significant, although 
that  for  “Fund  of  Funds”  is  still  not.   While  the  top  performers  in Model  (1)  are,  in  order,  Educational 
                                                          
9 These authors also do a robustness check using  just  funds rather  than LP‐fund pairs, which might contain  too much 
heterogeneity correlated with returns.  I repeat their process here and the results are qualitatively the same (unreported). 
  16
Institutions,  Foundation,  and  Government,  those  for  the  corrected  Model  (2)  are,  also  in  order, 
Consultants/Gatekeepers, Government, and Educational Institutions. 




In Table 8, Model (3), I show the estimation with an  indicator for FOF‐usage.   That  is, unlike the previous 




LP  type.   Model  (4) shows  the  interactions between  the  indicators  for FOF‐usage and LP  type.   To see  the 
performance of FOF‐usage,  I need  to conduct  joint  tests of  the  indicators for both FOF‐usage and LP  type.  
Table 9 shows  that all  joint  tests are significant, both statistically and for most LP  types, economically  too, 
and in a negative way. 








conditional on FOF usage, how well do LPs’ FOF  investments do versus  their non‐FOF  investments?   The 
second is called “user‐non‐user comparison”: how well do FOF users do versus non‐users in selecting non‐
FOF  (regular)  funds?    The  (b)  panel  in  Figure  1  provides  a  simplifying  picture  of  these  comparisons.    I 
tabulate the answers, by LP type, in Table 10.  In general, I observe that those FOF users who are good (can 












propositions  for why FOFs could do better  (or worse)  than other  funds  in  the FOF‐users’ portfolios:  size, 
ability to better attract and retain talent (especially those with experience and relationships to gain access to 
better funds), and risks taken. 
1 – Returns Driven by Size?   Continuing with  the dataset of LP‐fund pairs, a simple OLS  regression with 







interactions  vanishes.   However,  a  joint  test  on whether  all  these  interactions  are  simultaneously  zero  is 
roundly  rejected, with  a  chi‐square  of  3,300,000  and  a  p‐value  of  zero.    Furthermore,  the  regression  as  a 





I also use an alternative way of checking  the size effect, similar  to  that used by Lerner, Schoar and Wong 
(2004) when  they  test  for  the effect of  investment style.   Using a specification  that  includes  fund  type, LP 
type, and vintage,  they  look at how  the adjusted R‐square goes up with additional variables.    In my case, 
adding size and size squared increases the adjusted R‐square slightly, from 13.8% to 15.5%.  The coefficient 




LPs  in attracting, developing, and retaining talent.   I do not have pay  information, and even  if I do, many 
FOFs have been established only  recently, so  to  the extent  their managers’ pay have variable components 
such  as  interest  carry,  the  pay  information  might  not  be  useful.    Therefore,  I  focus  on  two  observable 
elements of talent that are important: experience and access. 
My data on experience  is also somewhat sketchy, because I do not have executives’ experience  in the LPs, 




are  in  our  earlier  dataset.    There  are  18  in  this  last  group,  out  of  the  709 we  have  earlier.    I  check  for 
representativeness,  and  their  sizes  and  vintages  are  not  particularly  skewed  (unreported).    The  striking 
observation about Table 12  is  that  the average private equity executive has slightly  less experience and  is 
younger than the average money manager, and the one in private equity FOFs has even less.  More formal 
regressions in Table 13 confirm this.  While this cannot be said to be confirming evidence that FOF executives 
are  less experienced or younger  than  those  in other LPs, and even  less  indicative of any relationship with 
returns,  the  fact  that  they  are  so  viz‐a‐viz  other  private  equity  funds  mildly  suggests  that  the  lack  of 
experience might be the reason for FOFs’ relatively poor performance. 
The measure of talent is access.  I use two ways to analyze this.  First, I have some data on LP‐specific timing 


















does not  control  for  lateness.    In Model  (2),  I add  lateness and  the  interaction of  lateness with  fund  size.  
Without the interaction, the lateness variable has a positive coefficient (unreported).  I interpret this finding 
as masking early entry into low and high quality funds.   Rushing into smaller funds, which I suggest is of 
generally poorer or unknown quality compared with  larger  funds, does not  tend  to provide good  results.  

























short,  these  two  tests  can only  falsify  the proposition  that diversification  is  a motive, but not  support  it.  
There  is a  third  test  that  can do  the  latter.    I  can  check  the diversification of  the FOF‐user  right before  it 
invests  in FOFs.    If  the diversification  is  lower  than  that afforded by  the FOF,  this  rough event‐study can 
attest to diversification as a possible motive. 
I  use  several measures  of  diversification.    These  are  the  number  of  non‐FOF  funds  and  the  number  of 










degree  of  diversification),  the  NASDAQ  level,  fund  sequence  number,  and  fixed  effects  for  three  LP 

























ability  to  identify  funds and  their disciplined  investment processes.   Furthermore, a picture correlating LP 
size with fund size  in Figure 4 shows that most small LPs  invest only  in small FOFs.   Why they do not or 
cannot invest in larger FOFs is probably for the same reason that they do not or cannot invest in larger funds 
for diversification.  This speculation is an interesting proposition for future work. 
2  – Upward Scaling  for Efficiency?   Although diversification may not be  an  explanation, what  about  the 
other dimension of upward scaling,  that sub‐scale LPs might use FOFs  to get  to minimum efficient scale?  
Like  the  diversification  story,  this  predicts  that  FOF  usage  is  higher  among  smaller  funds.    Unlike 
diversification, it can be confirmed if I observe that the cost of fund management is higher for smaller LPs.  
Since I do not have cost data, I look at the next best thing: the relative performance of FOF‐users versus non‐
users  for different LP  sizes.    If FOFs help  small LPs  in  overcoming  scale  issues  in  their  search  for high‐
performing  funds,  then  I expect  that among small LPs, FOF‐usage delivers better returns, net of expenses.  
Table  17, Panel  (a),  shows  the  results  for  this  test.   Unlike  the previous ones,  I now  compare  the overall 
performance  of  LPs  –  FOF  investments  or  not  ‐  since  I  expect  that  any  overhead  is  spread  over  both 
portfolios.   All variants of  the  test do not  reject  the hypothesis of upward  scaling  to overcome  sub‐scale 
                                                          
11 This is a measure of diversification of both FOF and non‐FOF investments by LPs.  It would be interesting to see how 
the  level  of diversification  in  the  non‐FOF  portfolio  changes with  FOF use,  but my dataset does  not  have  sufficient 
number of observations to do this in a fixed effects model. 











serial  correlation  of  the  disturbance  terms,  so  I  cluster  on GP  identity.    I  also  control  for  the  variables 
previous discussed, and estimate with a number of effects, such as year and fund stage.   The prediction  is 
supported.   The  intra‐user  comparison  shows  that FOF‐users’ FOF portfolio has  a  statistically  significant, 
negative (‐4.46 + 3.98) effect on reinvesting; the F statistic on these the two relevant indicators is 478, with a 
































Table  18  shows  the  existence  of  this  trade‐off  between  “spreading  out  over  many  FOFs,  risking  mis‐
coordination” and “not staging investments in one FOF, risking being held up.”  The dependant variable is a 
measure  of  “staging”:  the  maximum  sequence  number  of  the  funds  an  LP  put  with  a  GP.    The  key 
explanatory variable of  interest  is “spreading out,” measured by  the number of FOFs used by a LP at  the 
time of the last staged investment in that GP.  It has a significant negative sign, as predicted.  To avoid serial 
correlation, I cluster this estimation on LP identity, and have a number of effects in place.  The other control 
variables have  the  intuitive signs  too.   For example,  the more other non‐FOFs,  the  less  time  the LP has  to 
monitor  this  FOF  GP,  so  the  more  staging  is  involved.    The  higher  flow  of  funds  as  indicated  by  the 





effort  (although  that  in  itself  is  subject  to  free‐rider  problems  –  e.g.,  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)).  
Empirically, therefore, it appears that the dominant force is the former, leading to a positive coefficient. 





Downward  scaling  can  also mean  that  LPs  use  FOFs  so  that  they  can  collapse many  tedious  fund‐level 
approvals into an umbrella approval for a FOF given discretionary authority, and they do not have to build 
enormous  capacity  during  the  sparse  investment  points  and  capital  calls,  only  to  have  the  capacity 
underutilized  at  other  times.      Both  of  these  are  efficiency  arguments,  and  are  covered  in  the  previous 
discussion on outsourcing.  Therefore, I do not repeat any testing here. 
GOVERNANCE 
Table 3, Panel  (b), shows a  lot of heterogeneity between FOF‐user and non‐users by LP  type.   However,  I 
need  to  control  for  other  explanations,  such  as LP  size, given  the discussion  on upward  and downward 








and  that  for LP age  is  insignificant.   But what  if  learning  is more  specific, at  the  level of FOF  type?   For 
example, an LP may learn about investing in buyouts only from using buyout FOFs.  In Model (2), I repeat 








FOFs,  not  specific  experience with  special  types  of  FOFs  –  e.g.,  those  specializing  in  buyout  or  venture 
capital investments.  The signs of the coefficients for experience, IRR, and the interaction are the opposite of 
what I would expect from a learning story.  In Model (2), I remove the experience variables and the sign for 





consistent with a  learning story, although  the coefficients are not statistically significant.   This  repeats  the 
early  conclusion  in  Panel  (a):  learning  in  a  general way  is  unsupported,  but  there  is weak  support  for 
learning if I look at learning within specialized investment areas. 
TEMPORARY OR CYCLICAL PHENOMENON 
In  the previous  estimations,  the  coefficient on  the NASDAQ  level and other unreported proxies  for  fund 
flows  is often negative when  the dependant variable  is a measure of performance – e.g., Table 8, Table 17 
Panel  (a).   When  the dependant variable  is FOF‐usage,  the coefficient  is positive – e.g.: Table 19, Table 20 










large  volumes  in  short  periods  of  time.   On  the  one  hand,  using many  partners  can  cause  coordination 
problems.  On the other hand, using few partners subject an organization to hold‐up problems.  The obvious 
solution of staging only returns us  to  the original problem of not pushing  large  throughputs.   What other 




















































Table 1 - Example Funds of Funds 
This table shows a few examples of the larger funds of funds.  GP means general partner, LP means limited partner, and vintage means when the fund started. 
 
 
GP Fund Nation State Vintage
Size 
($mil) Example LPs` 
1 Capital Z Investment Partners (FKA: Capital 
Z Partners, Ltd) 
Capital Z Investments, L.P. US NY 1998 1500 Zurich Financial Services 
2 Swiss Life Private Equity Partners Ltd Swiss Life Private Equity Holding SZ  1997 1500 Swiss Life 
3 Swiss Life Private Equity Partners Ltd (fund 
now owned by Alpha Assoiates) 
5E Holding (Excellence in Eastern Emerging 
Equity) 
SZ  1998 1500 Allgemeine Pensionskasse der SAirGroup, 
Adroit Investment AG, 
Basler Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft, 
Pensionskasse des Basler Staatspersonals 
4 Thomas Weisel Partners, LLC Thomas Weisel Global Growth Partners US CA 2000 1300 CalPERS 
5 Lexington Capital Partners Lexington Capital Partners II US MA 1999 330 Pomplemousse, L.P. 
Lakeview Direct Investments, Inc. 
Franz and Frieder Burda 
6 Great Hill Equity Partners, LLC Great Hill II US MA 2000 330 First Union Capital Partners, Inc. 
Heller Financial, Inc. 
7 Auda Securities GmbH (Main Office) Auda Capital II L.P. US NY 1998 312 Henry Luce Foundation, Inc. 
8 Goldman, Sachs & Co. Goldman Sachs Private Equity Partners II, 
L.P. 
US NY 1998 250 Southern Company Services, Inc. 
Warner-Lambert Company 
9 GTCR Golder Rauner LLC Golder Thoma Cressey Rauner II US IL 1984 235 Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. 
Pack River Investment Company 
10 Leonard Green & Partners Green Equity Investors III US CA 1999 215.7 Citicorp Alternative Investment Strategies 
Jackson National Life Insurance Co. 
Grand Avenue Associates, L.P. 
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Table 2 – Comparison of Datasets by Source 
This table compares the number of observations from the main sources used in the table.  The column “How many more 
here?” means the number of times the “dataset in this paper” (last row) is bigger over the source in the row.  IRR means 
“internal rate of return.” 
 
 Funds 


























8,317 1.2x 0 - 1,900 2.1x 5,191 3.0x 
Private Equity 
Intelligence 1,782 5.4x 1,516 1.1x     
Alternative Assets 
Galante 1,609 6.0x 0 - 404 9.7x 7,003 2.2x 
Other sources – e.g.: 
LPs, websites 3,141* 3.1x 2,077* 0.8x 3,953 1.0x 4,442 3.5x 
Dataset in this paper 9,659 1.0x 1,734 1.0x 3,927 1.0x 15,514 1.0x 
* Include observations that are also in other sources. 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics for LPs 
This table summarizes the information about limited partners (LPs).  Panel (a) compares LPs who are also funds of funds 
(FOFs) from those who are not, such as non-financial corporations, government funds, etc.  Panel (b) compares in an 
orthogonal way, showing LPs who use FOFs and those who do not.  “Num of PE funds” means the number of private 
equity funds in which an LP invests.  If the LP invests through FOFs, this number includes the private equity funds held by 
the FOFs.  “Num of FOFs” is the number of FOFs employed by an LP.  “Col%” are percentages by column and “Row%” 
are by row.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
(a) FOFs and non-FOFs 
 All FOFs Non-FOFs 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total obs 3,927     709     3,218     
Year started 2,502 1,991 7 1,935 2,004 588 1,998 4 1,979 2,004 1,914 1,989 7 1,935 2,001 
Assets managed 2,628 2,727 12,363 0 300,000 600 335 595 1 6,744 2,028 3,435 13,992 0 300,000
Num of PE funds 2,400 6.6 18.4 1 410 325 9.6 12.8 1 125 2,075 6.2 19.1 1 410 
Num of FOFs 2,377 0.5 1.9 0 33 301 0.1 0.3 0 2 2,076 0.5 2.0 0 33 
Max num of LPs 
 in FOFs 3,834 2.0 8.2 0 58 616 0.7 3.3 0 27 3,218 2.3 8.8 0 58 
Allocation to:                
Stocks 857 46.1 14.5 2 95 0     857 46.1 14.5 2 95 
Fixed income 846 31.5 12.5 0 100 1 9.8 . 10 10 845 31.5 12.5 0 100 
Private equity 556 5.5 16.5 0 100 9 82.1 36.8 0 100 547 4.2 12.6 0 100 
FOFs 89 43.8 37.0 0 100 0     89 43.8 37.0 0 100 
LP class N % col N % col N % col 
Non Fin. Corp 862 25.9   862 32.8 
Government 718 21.5   718 27.3 
Fund of Funds 709 21.3 709 100.0   
Investment Banks 385 11.5   385 14.7 
Educational Inst. 176 5.3   176 6.7 
Insurance 145 4.4   145 5.5 
Banks/Fin. Corp. 142 4.3   142 5.4 
Foundation 91 2.7   91 3.5 
Other Non Profits 52 1.6   52 2.0 
Consultants 15 0.5   15 0.6 
Others 40 1.2   40 1.5 
Total 3,335 100.0 709 100.0 2,626 100.0 
Continent N Col% Row% N Col% Row% N Col% Row% 
Americas 3,432 90 100 515 83 15 2,917 91 85 
Europe 348 9 100 98 16 28 250 8 72 
Other 46 1 100 9 1 20 37 1 80 
 3,826 100  622 100  3,204 100  
US state (top few) N Col% Row% N Col% Row% N Col% Row% 
NY 469 14 100 125 24 27 344 12 73 
CA 376 11 100 85 16 23 291 10 77 
MA 307 9 100 68 13 22 239 8 78 
IL 258 8 100 54 10 21 204 7 79 
CT 197 6 100 100 19 51 97 3 49 
TX 163 5 100 15 3 9 148 5 91 
 
Amounts are in million dollars. 
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(b) FOF-users and non-users 
 
 All FOF-users Non-users 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total obs 3,927 4,739 1,704 1 12,639 414 4,705 1,267 2 7,007 3,513 4,743 1,749 1 12,639
Year started 2,502 1991 7 1935 2004 314 1989 8 1935 2001 2,188 1991 7 1936 2004 
Assets managed 2,628 2,727 12,363 0 300,000 324 10,656 28,059 1 300,000 2,304 1,612 7,337 0 142,339
Num of PE funds 2,400 6.6 18.4 1 410 413 20.0 37.4 1 410 1,987 3.9 8.5 1 153 
Num of FOFs 2,377 0.5 1.9 0 33 414 2.7 3.7 1 33 1,963 0.0 0.0 0 0 
Allocation to:                
Stocks 857 46.1 14.5 2 95 171 53.7 14.8 3 89 686 44.2 13.7 2 95 
Fixed income 846 31.5 12.5 0 100 172 28.2 11.7 7 84 674 32.4 12.6 0 100 
Private equity 556 5.5 16.5 0 100 194 5.4 12.9 0 100 362 5.6 18.1 0 100 
FOFs 89 43.8 37.0 0 100 89 43.8 37.0 0 100 0     
Max num of LPs 
 in FOFs 3,834 2.0 8.2 0 58 414 18.6 17.6 0 58 3,420 0.0 0.0 0 0 
LP class N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
Non Fin. Corp 862 100 26 86 10 21 776 90 26 
Government 718 100 22 93 13 23 625 87 21 
Fund of Funds 709 100 21 31 4 8 678 96 23 
Investment Banks 385 100 12 16 4 4 369 96 13 
Educational Inst. 176 100 5 106 60 26 70 40 2 
Insurance 145 100 4  -  123 85 4 
Banks/Fin. Corp. 142 100 4 15 11 4 127 89 4 
Foundation 91 100 3 17 19 4 74 81 3 
Other Non Profits 52 100 2 11 21 3 41 79 1 
Consultants 15 100 0 1 7 0 14 93 0 
Others 40 100 1 27 68 7 35 88 1 
Total 3,335 100  403 100  2,932 100  
Continent N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
Americas 3,432 100 90 366 11 93 3,066 89 89 
Europe 348 100 9 25 7 6 323 93 9 
Other 46 100 1 2 4 1 44 96 1 
Total 3,826  100 393  100 3,433  100 
US state (top few) N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
NY 469 100 14 47 10 13 422 90 14 
CA 376 100 11 36 10 10 340 90 11 
MA 307 100 9 26 8 7 281 92 9 
IL 258 100 8 27 10 8 231 90 8 
CT 197 100 6 21 11 6 176 89 6 
TX 163 100 5 18 11 5 145 89 5 
 
Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
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Table 4 – Summary Statistics for Funds 
This table summarizes information about private equity funds, including funds of funds (FOFs).  “$ in PC” means the 
amount invested in a portfolio company.  If the fund is an FOF, the information like “Round ave” and “$ in PC, ave” are for 
rounds and portfolio companies via the investee funds of the FOF.  “Yrs between close to 1st investment” is the number of 
years from the close of the fund to the year of its first investment, whether in a private equity firm (for non-FOFs) or fund 
(for FOFs).  “Excess IRRs” are IRRs deviations from the benchmark IRR of funds grouped by: (1) vintage, (2) stage (e.g., 
early versus mezzanine), (3), investment scope (e.g., venture capital versus distressed debt), and (4) continent (e.g., 
Americas versus Europe).  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
 All FOFs Non-FOFs 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total obs. 9,659 6,685 4,109 1 12,776 709 2,558 2,516 1 12,639 8,950 7,012 4,033 277 12,776
Vintage 6,624 1,992 9 1,947 2,004 588 1,998 4 1,979 2,004 6,036 1,991 9 1,947 2,004 
Size 8,441 239 1,883 0.100 95,549 600 335 595 0.800 6,744 7,841 231 1,947 0.100 95,549
Size targeted 2,745 264 503 0.200 5,235 208 352 447 5.000 3,200 2,537 257 507 0.200 5,235 
Round ave 6,270 5 23 0.002 1,040 136 6 10 0.004 88 6,134 5 23 0.002 1,040 
Round max 6,270 20 104 0.002 3,757 136 22 56 0.007 500 6,134 19 105 0.002 3,757 
Round min 6,270 2 19 0.000 1,040 136 2 5 0.001 49 6,134 2 19 0.000 1,040 
$ in PC, ave 6,270 6 25 0.002 1,040 136 7 11 0.004 88 6,134 6 25 0.002 1,040 
$ in PC, max 6,266 21 107 0.002 3,757 136 23 56 0.007 500 6,130 21 108 0.002 3,757 
$ in PC, min 6,266 2 19 0.000 1,040 136 2 6 0.001 49 6,130 2 19 0.000 1,040 
Num of rounds 6,516 22 37 1 647 140 22 38 1 278 6,376 22 37 1 647 
Num of PCs 6,586 13 18 1 310 210 13 18 1 125 6,376 13 18 1 310 
Sequence num, by
series 9,659 1 1 1 14 709 2 2 1 14 8,950 1 1 1 14 
Sequence num, by
GP 5,987 4 6 1 67 402 7 7 1 36 5,585 4 6 1 67 
Date closed 6887 29oct91 3143 01jan58 28sep04 314 24dec97 1,925 01may78 28sep04 6,573 13jul91 3,150 01jan58 23sep04
Yrs between close 
to 1st investment 5,376 1 3 -40 35 101 1 3 -13 9 5,275 1 3 -40 35 
Yrs between 1st to 
last investment 5,376 6 7 0 52 101 4 5 0 22 5,275 6 7 0 52 
IRR (%) 1,734 6.3 41 -100 535 162 2.7 27 -96 93 1,572 6.7 43 -100 535 
Excess IRR (%) 1,734 5.1 41 -100 532 162 2.7 26 -98 88 1,572 5.4 42 -100 532 
Invest scope N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
Advising 2 0.0 100.0   - 2 0.0 100.0 
All 927 17.7 100.0 30 10.0 3.2 897 18.1 96.8 
Buyout 1,049 20.0 100.0 116 38.5 11.1 933 18.9 88.9 
Co-investment 3 0.1 100.0   - 3 0.1 100.0 
Development 21 0.4 100.0   - 21 0.4 100.0 
Distressed 39 0.7 100.0   - 39 0.8 100.0 
Fund of Funds 24 0.5 100.0 22 7.3 91.7 2 0.0 8.3 
Industry 86 1.6 100.0   - 86 1.7 100.0 
International 3 0.1 100.0   - 3 0.1 100.0 
Venture Capital 3,091 58.9 100.0 133 44.2 4.3 2,958 59.8 95.7 
Total 5,245 100.0  301 100.0  4,944 100.0  
Stage N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
Seed 252 3 100 1 1 0.4 251 3 100 
Early 2,030 25 100 12 9 1 2,018 25 99 
Mezzanine 241 3 100 6 5 2 235 3 98 
Expansion 747 9 100 1 1 0.1 746 9 100 
Late 2,605 32 100 95 71 4 2,510 31 96 
All 2,394 29 100 18 14 1 2,376 29 99 






 All FOFs Non-FOFs 
Owner type N % col  N % col  N % col  
PRIV 5,628 62     5,628 67  
FINCORP 877 10     877 10  
CORPVEN 815 9     815 10  
SECFOF 709 8  709 100  59 1  
IBANK 708 8     708 8  
INDIV 101 1     101 1  
SBIC 59 1        
DEVEL 39 0.4     39 0.5  
ADV 37 0.4     37 0.4  
PENSION 36 0.4     36 0.4  
GOVT 30 0.3     30 0.4  
ENDOW 20 0.2     20 0.2  
UNIV 14 0.2     14 0.2  
PUBLIC 11 0.1     11 0.1  
EGRN 4 0.0     4 0.1  
Total 9,088 100  709 100  8,379 100  
Continent N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
Americas 7,183 78 100 515 83 7 6,668 78 93 
Europe 1,245 14 100 98 16 8 1,147 13 92 
Others 751 8 100 8 751 1 751 8 100 
Total 9,179 100  622 100  8,557 100  
US state (top few) N % row % col N % row % col N % row % col 
CA 1,668 23 100 CA 85 16 5 CA 1,583 
NY 1,440 20 100 NY 125 24 9 NY 1,315 
MA 793 11 100 MA 68 13 9 MA 725 
CT 392 5 100 CT 100 19 26 TX 340 
IL 384 5 100 IL 54 10 14 IL 330 
TX 355 5 100 TX 15 3 4 CT 292 
 
Primary investor types: 
ADV = advisors who are non-FOFs 
CORPVEN = corporate ventures 
DEVEL = development programs, including community programs 
EGRN = evergreen funds 
ENDOW = endowments and foundations 
FINCORP = financial corporations, including those of government affiliates 
GOVT = government programs, both national and state 
IBANK = investment banks and their venture subsidiaries 
INDIV = individuals and families 
PENSION = pension funds, corporate and public 
PRIV = private partnerships 
PUBLIC = public firms 
SBIC = Small Business Investment Companies, including MESBIC, public SBIC 
SECFOF = secondary partnerships and FOFs 
UNIV = university programs 
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Table 5 – Summary of Means for LP-fund Pairs 
This table summarizes the means of limited partner (LP) and fund pairs.  Panel (a) shows the breakdown by LP type, panel (b) by whether the LP in the LP-fund pair is a user of funds 
of funds (FOFs).  In the “Allocation” columns, “Eq” means equities, “Fixed Inc” fixed income, “Priv Eq” private equity.  “# of PC” is the number of portfolio companies in the fund of the 
LP-fund observation.  If the fund is an FOF, then it includes the portfolio companies of the investee funds of the FOF.  “Seq num” is the sequence number of the fund, whether by fund 
series or general partner (GP).  “Excess IRRs” are IRRs deviations from the benchmark IRR of funds grouped by: (1) vintage, (2) stage (e.g., early versus mezzanine), (3), investment 
scope (e.g., venture capital versus distressed debt), and (4) continent (e.g., Americas versus Europe).  “Weighted IRR” use commitment by the LP to the fund as a percentage of the 
total commitment by the LP to private equity funds as weight.  Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated.  
* Although some non-users indicate a link to FOFs, their allocation to them is zero, so I retain their status as non-users. 
(a) By LP Type 
   LP Fund 
    Allocation # of PC  Seq num IRR Weighted IRR 
LP type Fund 
type 










Fund Excess For 
LP 
Fund Excess
Total All 15,514 20,466.0 52.7 26.3 7.0 18.8 3.9 57.6 792.0 2.0 5.9 8.2 4.7 3.2 21.7 3.2 0.7 
 Buyout 5,256 22,951.0 52.6 26.6 7.3 17.8 4.0 62.0 1,333.0 1.7 5.0 10.0 1.9 -1.4 10.4 0.9 -2.5 
 Focused 528 24,130.0 52.8 26.3 5.8 15.4 4.2 55.4 1,235.0 1.8 4.7 11.8 9.1 0.1 1.0 9.1 -0.1 
 FOF 1,432 24,046.0 54.1 27.5 5.7 27.6 7.1 55.9 692.0 2.4 8.8 -0.4 -1.5 0.9 41.9 -6.8 -9.7 
 Mixed 2,446 17,462.0 52.7 26.5 7.4 16.7 3.4 54.5 621.0 2.1 6.6 9.3 5.1 2.5 27.4 -2.1 -5.1 
 VC 5,037 17,867.0 52.2 25.7 7.0 17.9 3.2 56.4 347.0 2.3 6.4 9.0 8.7 10.3 25.6 15.0 15.6 
Consultants All 105 2,215.0  9.8 53.5 6.8 0.1 18.6 634.0 2.0 6.1  4.9 3.4    
 Buyout 37 2,364.0  9.8 53.1 6.8 0.1 18.6 1,035.0 1.9 4.3  5.0 1.8    
 Focused 4 2,308.0   37.3 6.8 0.3 14.0 965.0 1.8 7.3  4.7 -4.1    
 FOF                  
 Mixed 19 1,875.0  9.8 47.2  - 20.3 534.0 2.0 6.4  -18.9 -22.0    
 VC 41 2,390.0  9.8 56.9 6.8 0.0 18.6 313.0 2.2 7.4  14.7 15.8    
Educational Inst All 1,960 19,331.0 45.5 22.2 8.2 9.8 2.6 59.7 750.0 2.3 6.5 12.7 11.0 10.0 23.4 1.9 0.3 
 Buyout 539 25,431.0 43.8 20.5 9.3 5.8 2.4 66.7 1,400.0 1.8 5.2 5.0 0.7 -2.4 11.2 20.2 17.1 
 Focused 84 24,400.0 44.9 23.0 5.3 5.5 2.6 51.2 1,307.0 1.9 5.1 -6.9 8.1 -0.6 -12.3 11.6 2.7 
 FOF 234 11,694.0 55.3 26.1 4.5 31.1 4.2 28.1 455.0 2.1 9.8 10.8 13.5 13.2 48.6 -11.4 -13.1 
 Mixed 273 17,909.0 45.7 23.3 7.3 9.4 2.6 62.8 592.0 2.4 6.6 14.8 7.4 4.6 27.0 19.4 16.4 
 VC 756 18,377.0 45.1 22.5 8.8 9.0 2.5 62.4 389.0 2.7 7.2 20.6 20.4 22.6 26.3 23.3 22.5 
Financial Inst All 2,498 11,396.0 13.0 70.0 6.5 27.2 1.0 31.4 623.0 1.9 5.3 24.0 4.0 1.9  5.7 3.7 
 Buyout 960 11,845.0 14.5 68.6 7.7 26.1 0.9 37.2 1,029.0 1.7 4.6  2.9 -0.4  5.5 2.6 
 Focused 66 10,746.0   5.6 34.5 0.8 15.7 815.0 1.7 3.9  5.1 -3.7    
 FOF 137 15,647.0 6.0 76.2 7.6 43.0 3.0 26.5 683.0 2.8 8.7  -9.9 -5.8  -0.6 -2.1 
 Mixed 381 11,066.0 18.6 65.1 8.1 18.3 1.2 36.2 451.0 1.8 5.0  3.7 1.0  -3.3 -6.3 





   LP Fund 
    Allocation Num of investees  Seq num IRR Weighted IRR 
LP type 
Fund 





Foundation All 543 2,841.0 51.8 25.6 2.5 26.8 0.8 20.4 701.0 2.1 6.5  10.8 9.4  -10.4 -12.6 
 Buyout 156 3,104.0 50.9 26.6 2.7 26.8 0.7 21.1 1,301.0 1.8 5.5  1.6 -1.0  -7.3 -9.9 
 Focused 37 1,540.0 51.4 21.3 4.0  0.5 12.1 1,311.0 1.9 4.8  6.3 -2.6    
 FOF 34 2,123.0 57.9 22.7 1.9 35.8 2.1 13.5 777.0 2.7 7.7  -11.1 -8.7  -20.2 -21.9 
 Mixed 79 2,737.0 52.9 26.5 1.3 25.2 0.9 21.8 351.0 1.6 6.5  9.8 6.8  -14.2 -17.3 
 VC 214 3,183.0 51.2 26.1 2.6 26.3 0.6 23.1 328.0 2.5 7.6  22.2 23.8  -9.3 -8.5 
Fund of Funds All 2,723 422.0  9.8 66.6  0.1 21.7 812.0 2.3 6.1 20.2 -0.3 -0.4  -21.7 -16.3 
 Buyout 831 449.0  9.8 65.4  0.2 20.2 1,429.0 1.7 5.1 282.0 -1.0 -4.5    
 Focused 22 623.0   100.0  0.2 19.1 1,759.0 1.7 5.7  11.1 2.0    
 FOF 124 429.0   100.0  0.4 21.6 1,160.0 4.4 7.6 -8.9 -19.1 -10.2    
 Mixed 558 467.0  9.8 70.5  0.1 20.7 660.0 2.5 6.8  1.8 -0.6    
 VC 1,128 377.0  9.8 56.9  0.1 23.1 390.0 2.4 6.4  1.1 4.2  -21.7 -16.3 
Government All 4,669 40,872.0 54.6 27.8 6.0 17.9 10.0 121.6 983.0 2.0 5.8 6.2 3.8 2.1 11.7 2.2 -1.8 
 Buyout 1,804 41,272.0 54.4 28.0 6.0 17.3 9.6 118.1 1,525.0 1.8 5.0 9.6 2.2 -1.1 7.8 -0.2 -3.8 
 Focused 179 40,773.0 55.6 27.5 5.9 14.5 9.6 115.1 1,311.0 1.6 4.7 14.6 13.4 4.2 9.6 10.6 1.7 
 FOF 565 40,845.0 53.4 27.6 5.7 19.8 12.4 106.7 767.0 2.1 8.4 0.2 -3.8 -2.1 -4.4 18.9 -2.4 
 Mixed 668 37,946.0 54.1 27.6 6.4 17.0 9.6 120.7 736.0 2.1 7.1 6.4 6.4 3.7 32.7 -9.0 -12.0 
 VC 1,225 41,371.0 55.1 27.7 5.7 19.5 10.0 133.8 380.0 2.2 6.0 3.7 6.3 7.5 19.2 16.8 18.0 
Non-Fin Corp All 2,533 13,096.0 60.2 25.5 4.1 21.9 1.6 19.4 663.0 1.8 5.8 24.0 6.5 4.3  3.3 0.5 
 Buyout 799 12,567.0 59.7 26.3 3.9 21.4 1.7 23.0 1,152.0 1.7 4.7  3.9 0.8  -1.4 -5.1 
 Focused 100 11,841.0 57.2 27.5 3.4 18.6 1.5 19.4 1,232.0 1.9 4.5  6.0 -3.0  12.2 2.3 
 FOF 231 15,232.0 60.5 25.7 5.1 35.2 4.2 21.7 604.0 2.1 10.5  2.6 5.2  -2.9 -2.2 
 Mixed 412 11,356.0 60.6 25.4 3.6 16.9 1.2 17.1 605.0 1.8 7.2  6.9 4.1  1.1 -2.0 
 VC 771 14,578.0 61.0 23.8 4.0 15.4 1.2 19.9 257.0 2.0 6.0 24.0 10.4 11.1  17.2 17.5 
Other Non Profits All 294 4,434.0 49.7 22.9 9.6 23.1 2.7 22.4 851.0 2.2 6.5  3.7 2.3  12.9 10.3 
 Buyout 91 4,695.0 50.3 21.0 10.5  2.0 20.9 1,490.0 1.8 6.1  -1.5 -4.3  4.9 2.3 
 Focused 22 2,366.0 45.8 29.6 5.7  2.0 15.4 1,036.0 1.6 3.8  5.6 -3.3  7.7 -1.1 
 FOF 38 4,391.0 52.0 21.7 12.3 23.1 5.9 24.3 675.0 2.5 10.9  5.8 4.9  15.3 13.6 
 Mixed 38 3,224.0 49.5 22.9 7.2 23.1 2.3 21.4 645.0 2.1 6.1  15.3 12.6  46.5 43.4 
 VC 103 5,162.0 49.3 23.5 10.2 23.1 2.5 25.2 388.0 2.5 6.9  2.6 4.6  11.7 13.7 
Other All 189 4,404.0 54.6 39.1 0.0 100.0 2.2 10.8 571.0 2.1 6.9  6.8 4.7    
 Buyout 39      0.1 9.7 831.0 1.6 6.7  2.5 -0.6    
 Focused 14      - 7.6 1,259.0 1.9 5.1  5.6 -3.2    
 FOF 68 2,692.0   0.0 100.0 5.9 7.5 472.0 2.3 9.6  4.7 3.7    
 Mixed 18 22,500.0   0.0 100.0 0.1 15.4 653.0 1.8 4.0  -2.9 -5.6    
 VC 46 22,500.0   0.0 100.0 0.3 15.9 252.0 2.6 8.0  15.9 16.2    
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 (b) By FOF-usage 
   LP Fund 
    Allocation # of PCs  Seq num IRR Weighted IRR 
FOF usage 




Eq FOF FOFs Funds Size 
By 





FOF-users All 8,243 31,134.0 53.0 26.8 6.5 18.8 7.3 90.0 873.9 2.0 6.0 7.6 5.0 3.4 21.7 1.5 -1.1 
 Buyout 2,876 33,612.4 52.9 27.1 6.7 17.8 7.4 93.7 1,425.9 1.8 5.0 8.7 1.5 -1.7 1.0 12.2 2.3 
 Focused 313 33,420.8 53.3 26.4 5.9 15.4 7.0 84.4 1,249.6 1.7 4.6 11.6 10.7 1.6 41.9 -6.8 -9.7 
 FOF 1,284 26,063.9 54.1 27.5 5.8 27.6 7.9 59.5 619.4 1.9 8.4 -0.4 3.1 4.0 27.4 -5.5 -8.5 
 VC 2,289 30,723.6 52.6 26.3 6.2 17.9 7.1 98.7 374.3 2.3 6.4 9.0 9.8 11.3 25.6 12.1 12.7 
 Mixed 1,141 29,591.9 52.6 26.7 7.1 16.7 7.3 94.4 711.0 2.1 7.1 9.3 5.2 2.6 10.4 1.4 -2.0 
Non-users All 7,271 4,269.0 51.6 24.4 8.4 0.0 0.0 20.8 701.3 2.1 5.9 34.7 4.4 3.1  7.8 5.3 
 Buyout 2,380 5,150.7 51.5 24.2 9.3 0.0 0.0 23.8 1,222.8 1.7 4.9 70.0 2.3 -1.0  -0.9 -4.3 
 Focused 215 4,202.7 51.1 25.7 5.4 0.0 0.0 13.2 1,217.1 1.9 4.8 21.5 6.4 -2.5  7.7 -1.1 
 FOF* 148 2,775.3 53.7 26.4 4.8 0.0 0.0 24.7 1,300.0 6.2 10.0  -20.7 -12.1  -29.8 -26.0 
 VC 2,748 4,085.2 50.9 23.6 8.9 0.0 0.0 21.2 326.0 2.3 6.5 9.1 7.7 9.4  19.5 20.1 
 Mixed 1,305 3,120.4 53.2 25.8 8.0 0.0 0.0 19.6 544.9 2.1 6.2  5.0 2.4  4.7 1.6 
 LP type                  
FOF-users Consultants/Gatekeepers 4,584 103.4   19.6 6.8 1.0 6.0 44.1 1.7 1.0  20.6 17.8    
 Educational Institutions 4,998 22,790.8 45.3 22.7 7.0 9.8 3.6 69.6 724.2 2.2 6.5 12.7 11.2 10.1  0.4 -1.1 
 Financial Institution 4,996 16,728.5 13.0 70.0 5.4 27.2 3.8 42.6 720.6 1.9 5.8  2.1 -0.3  5.9 3.5 
 Foundation 4,626 4,703.0 48.8 30.7 1.1 26.8 2.0 30.0 540.6 1.8 6.7  12.9 11.8  -9.1 -11.3 
 Fund of Funds 2,292 759.0   100.0  1.3 30.2 1,011.4 2.0 5.4 -8.9 -10.3 -10.5    
 Government 4,868 43,415.6 54.7 27.6 6.2 17.9 11.0 130.3 976.0 1.9 5.8 6.2 4.3 2.5  1.6 -1.9 
 Non Financial Corp 4,754 18,831.6 60.2 25.7 4.7 21.9 3.5 35.9 864.5 1.9 6.3  3.4 1.4  1.9 -0.8 
 Other Non Profits 4,483 6,535.8 52.2 19.9 13.7 23.1 4.8 32.9 779.6 2.4 7.0  2.7 2.4  18.2 17.9 
 Other 6,429 4,578.7   0.0 100.0 5.6 6.7 402.9 1.8 7.8  10.8 10.0    
Non-users Consultants/Gatekeepers 4,236 2,360.8  9.8 55.9  0.0 19.4 671.7 2.0 6.2  4.5 3.0    
 Educational Institutions 4,690 10,159.9 45.8 21.0 10.9  0.0 33.6 816.8 2.5 6.5  10.5 9.6  22.5 19.9 
 Financial Institution 4,759 7,601.4   8.0  0.0 27.3 587.5 1.8 5.1 24.0 4.8 2.7  5.5 3.9 
 Foundation 4,640 1,628.7 54.1 21.8 3.3  0.0 14.1 807.8 2.3 6.4  9.6 8.2  -14.5 -17.2 
 Fund of Funds 2,865 377.2  9.8 40.9  0.0 20.7 788.8 2.3 6.2 282.0 0.9 0.8  -21.7 -16.3 
 Government 4,672 14,130.4 53.2 29.6 3.4  0.0 37.6 1,049.2 2.2 6.0 6.5 -0.6 -2.6  7.3 -0.8 
 Non Financial Corp 4,668 4,813.8 60.1 25.0 2.9  0.0 5.6 488.9 1.7 5.4 24.0 9.5 7.2  17.7 14.4 
 Other Non Profits 4,420 1,545.8 42.1 32.5 4.0  0.0 8.8 940.2 1.9 6.0  4.9 2.1  12.9 10.3 




Table 6 – Performance of FOF among Funds 
This table uses OLS for models (1) through (3) and the Heckit procedure for (4) through (6), whose selection model is: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
Dependant variable: fund IRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 



































Log(seqByGP)  1.68 (4.34)    
Log(seqByGP)2  .25 (1.55)    














Vintage     - 
Stage (base is “All”)      
Seed     15.38 (21.42) 
Early     41.88 (18.94) 
Mezzanine     37.68 (18.85) 
Expansion     36.50 (18.62) 
Late     46.75 (19.11) 
Region (base is “Americas”)       
Europe     12.57 (8.08) 
Others     15.33 (12.78) 
Investment scope (base is “All”)      
Venture capital     -40.30 (20.16) 
Focused     -33.01 (25.15) 
Buyout     -54.11 (21.31) 
Round average     .03 (.03) 
Inverse Mills ratio (lambda)    -31.72 (11.51) 
-32.43 
(11.46) 
GP F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,256 1,183 1,253 724 709 
Adj R3 (or pseudo likelihood ratio, for 
estimations using Heckman correction) .07 .07 .07 -2320.7 -2225.5 
p-value of Wald test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 7 – Comparison of Data Subsets with and without IRR Information 
This table shows the potential sample selection bias for datasets with IRR information, compared with the subset without 
the information.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
(a) Funds dataset 
 With IRR Information Without 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
t on null that 
means are 
the same 
Size 1,276 498 794 1 6,500 7,165 193 2,013 0 95,549 -5.34 
Vintage 1,379 1987 10 1935 2,004 7,449 1991 9 1936 2,004 15.77 




Fund HQ in one of CA, NY, 
MA, PA   1,734 .52 .50 0 1 7,925 .40 .49 0 1 
-9.42 
Fund HQ in US or UK 1,734 .89 .31 0 1 7,925 .77 .42 0 1 -11.34 
IRR of previous fund in 
series 548 14.7 43.7 -94 513 523 1.5 38.4 -100 415 
-5.27 
 
(b) LP-fund dataset 
 With IRR Information Without 
LP type N Freq N Freq 
Z statistic for H0: 
same frequencies 
Banks/Financial Corp. 350 3.2 257 5.5 6.71 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 83 0.8 22 0.5 -2.05 
Educational Institutions 1,482 13.7 478 10.2 -5.89 
Foundation 372 3.4 171 3.7 0.73 
Fund of Funds 2,044 18.9 679 14.6 -6.46 
Government 3,646 33.6 1,023 21.9 -14.57 
Insurance 641 5.9 441 9.5 7.93 
Investment/Merchant Banks 473 4.4 335 7.2 7.24 
Non Financial Corporations 1,450 13.4 1,083 23.2 15.20 
Other Non Profits 204 1.9 90 1.9 0.20 
Other 101 0.9 89 1.9  5.07 
Total 10,846 100.0 4,668 100.0  
 
 With IRR Information Without 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max 
t for H0 : 
same 
means 
Fund vintage 1,158 1997 5 1978 2004 14,100 1991 9 1978 2004 -21.07 
Fund size 10,378 980 1,222 0.5 6,500 4,189 324 562 0.1 7,700 -33.33 
Round ave ($ 000) 8,567 20,965 46,282 6 460,928 2,686 9,313 33,444 7 322,772 -12.10 
Fund HQ in one of CA, 
NY, MA, PA   
10,846 0.63 0.48 0 1 4,668 0.50 0.50 0 1 -15.23 
Fund HQ in US or UK 10,846 0.97 0.16 0 1 4,668 0.79 0.41 0 1 -40.89 
IRR of previous fund 
in series 
656 15.4 44.9 -94.2 513.0 246 -5.6 24.8 -100.0 97.2 -6.92 
LP committed to fund 768 51 91 0 1,400 4,670 31 64 0 1,500 -7.58 
LP drawn from fund 614 21 102 -1,246 400 700 19 57 -291 841 -0.44 
LP vintage 1,061 1990 8 1935 2001 12,670 1991 8 1935 2004 3.77 
Log(LP size) 1,160 64,252 62,551 72 149,300 11,615 16,093 35,063 0 300,000 -40.75 
LP %alloc to equity 976 50 15 25 72 5,829 53 12 3 89 7.73 
LP %alloc to fixed inc 976 25 10 9 40 5,848 26 10 2 100 3.09 
LP %alloc to pte equity 943 5 3 0 13 7,272 7 14 0 100 4.36 
LP %alloc to FOF 515 29 11 7 37 2,438 17 19 0 100 -14.13 
Num of funds per LP  1,168 208 136 1 410 14,346 45 56 1 410 -82.12 
Num of FOFs per LP 1,168 14 12 0 32 14,346 3 6 0 33 -58.23 
LP & GP in same state 1,168 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 14,346 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 -5.52 
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Table 8 – Performance of FOFs among LPs 
This table shows how the fund IRR in LP-fund observations correlates with a number of explanatory variables.  Model (1) 
uses OLS, while the rest use the Heckit procedure, whose selection model is: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
 Dependant var: IRR for LP-
fund pairs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Educational Institutions 9.69 (6.07) 3.87 (6.54) 4.64 (6.54) 5.41 (6.44) 5.91 (6.28) 
Financial Institution 2.52 (6.09) -9.03 (8.65) -8.58 (8.56) -8.88 (8.40) -8.84 (8.45) 
Foundation 7.37 (6.37) 1.57 (7.61) 1.84 (7.63) 3.30 (8.34) 3.68 (8.31) 
Fund of Funds -1.93 (5.97) -2.63 (6.37) -2.45 (6.35) -1.47 (6.19) -1.21 (6.26) 
Government 5.72 (6.06) 5.60 (6.52) 6.57 (6.35) 6.04 (7.62) 6.13 (7.69) 
















Other Non Profits 4.55 (6.88) -2.98 (9.91) -2.38 (9.78) .73 (9.34) .99 (9.31) 
 Indicator for FOF-usage   -1.41 (.38) 17.33 (6.24) 17.13 (6.22) 
Educational Institutions    -18.98 (6.24) -18.93 (6.32) 
Financial Institution    -16.77 (7.89) -16.65 (7.92) 
Foundation    -21.51 (6.96) -21.52 (6.75) 
Fund of Funds    -22.31 (8.83) -22.17 (8.76) 
Government    -17.40 (8.59) -17.28 (8.43) 















Other Non Profits    -24.37 (7.44) -24.58 (7.26) 
 Indicator for FOF-fund     -21.13 (6.54) 
Educational Institutions     4.72 (12.83) 
Financial Institution     -.98 (8.80) 
Foundation     20.51 (6.38) 
Fund of Funds     11.87 (2.74) 
Government     20.45 (3.96) 















Other Non Profits     -5.56 (7.87) 
 FOF-usage x FOF-fund     4.72 (12.83) 
Educational Institutions     7.53 (13.60) 
Financial Institution     .63 (15.56) 
Foundation      
Fund of Funds     .59 (9.54) 
Government     -.08 (9.99) 





















Other Non Profits     38.05 (16.74) 
 LP vintage -.06 (.08) -.12 (.04) -.12 (.04) -.11 (.04) -.11 (.04) 
 LP and GP in same state -.56 (1.41) -.42 (1.16) -.45 (1.14) -.41 (1.15) -.49 (1.16) 
 NASDAQ level -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) 
 Log(LP size) -.13 (.29) .51 (.58) .57 (.59) .54 (.59) .53 (.58) 







 Indicators for LP location by 
state 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Fund stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












 Pseudo LR ratio 354.6 (Wald) -41,851 -41,851 -41,848 -41,844 
 p-value of Wald test .000 .001 .001 .001 .000 
  
  40
Table 9 – Statistical and Economic Significance of Joint-tests on FOF-usage and LP Type 
This table shows the joint tests of whether the use of funds of funds (FOFs) and limited partner (LP) type are significant.  It 
is for Model (4) in Table 8, where the specification is (Ind = indicator operator): 
 
IRR of LP-fund pair = βo + β1.Ind(LP types) + 
 β2 Ind(LP is FOF-user) + β 3.Ind(LP types) x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β4 LPvintage + β 5.Ind(LP & GP in same state)+ β6.NASDAQlevel + β7.Log(LP size) + ε. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
“Economic significance” is based on the mean levels of the appropriate variables concerned.  The mean IRR is 4.99%. 
 
 Statistical Significance Economic Significance 
Interaction of FOF-usage with LP 
type indicators 
Χ2  for H0: both 
coeff=0 p-value 
∂IRR/∂FOFusage for  
FOFusage 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 7.71 0.0055 17.3 
Educational Institutions 16.55 0.0003 -1.7 
Financial Institution  26.37 0.0000 0.6 
Foundation  9.67 0.0079 -4.2 
Fund of Funds 9.53 0.0085 -5.0 
Government 37.45 0.0000 -0.1 
Non Financial Corporations 79.49 0.0000 0.4 
Other Non Profits 18.82 0.0001 -7.0 
 
 
Table 10 – FOF Performance Compared in Two Ways 
This table shows two comparisons of FOF performance.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of 
the non-FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the 
performance generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the 
performance of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on 
LPs’ using them.  The full estimation is in Model (5) of Table 8, where the specification is (Ind = indicator operator): 
 
IRR of LP-fund pair = βo + β1.Ind(LP types) + 
 β2 Ind(LP is FOF-user) + β 3.Ind(LP types) x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β4 Ind(fund is FOF) + β 5.Ind(LP types) x Ind(fund is FOF) + 
β6 Ind(fund is FOF)x Ind(LP is FOF-user + 
β7.Ind(LP types) x Ind(fund is FOF)x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β8 LPvintage + β 9Ind(LP & GP in same state)+ β10.NASDAQlevel + β11.Log(LP size) + ε. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  




Do FOF-users pick regular funds better 
than non-users?  (IRR bp) 
Intra-user comparison: 
Do FOFs do better than non-FOFs? 
(IRR bp) 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 17.1 -16.4 
Educational Institutions -1.8 -4.1 
Financial Institution 0.5 -16.7 
Foundation -4.4 4.1 
Fund of Funds Not applicable Not applicable 
Government -0.1 4.0 
Non Financial Corporations 0.4 -3.1 
Other Non Profits -7.4 16.1 
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Table 11 – Size Effect on Performance 
This table uses IRR as the dependant variable.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of the non-
FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance 
generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance 
of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on LPs’ using them.   
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
  User-non-user  Intra-user  
 Dependant var: IRR for LP-fund 
pairs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Educational Institutions 8.68 (6.30) 5.38 (4.89) 23.19 (25.50) 6.05 (9.40) 
Financial Institution -8.54 (8.81) -7.83 (8.56) 3.33 (15.80) -5.57 (3.17) 
Foundation 6.75 (7.72) 3.73 (7.02) 8.31 (21.29) 3.87 (12.13) 
Fund of Funds 1.16 (6.37) -1.42 (5.31) -1.91 (15.49) -12.74 (3.85) 
Government 6.92 (7.99) -4.67 (10.11) 18.67 (19.12) -2.27 (6.37) 















Other Non Profits 1.93 (10.52) -1.17 (10.58) 5.43 (24.71) -.76 (7.54) 
 Indicator for FOF-usage 17.87 (6.45) -3.11 (11.97)   
Educational Institutions -17.31 (5.82) 3.79 (11.17)   
Financial Institution -19.78 (9.55) 5.26 (10.34)   
Foundation -24.23 (7.80) 4.44 (18.96)   
Fund of Funds -22.72 (9.13) -4.12 (8.23)   
Government -18.55 (10.66) 4.71 (12.09)   















Other Non Profits -27.52 (8.44) -.79 (11.52)   
 Indicator for FOF-fund   18.46 (3.01) -4.54 (16.91) 
Educational Institutions   -47.15 (8.83) -26.80 (19.65) 
Financial Institution   -14.93 (19.56)  
Foundation     
Fund of Funds   -16.98 (8.81) -1.40 (19.39) 
Government   -19.59 (3.67) 1.49 (16.09) 















Other Non Profits    7.09 (22.86) 
 Log(LP size) .56 (.73) -.62 (.25) .29 (.46) -.74 (.59) 
 Log(fund size)  2.58 (6.20)  4.82 (6.91) 
 Log(fund size)2  -.83 (.73)  -.97 (.78) 
 LP vintage -.16 (.06) -.10 (.06) -.04 (.07) .02 (.11) 
 LP and GP in same state .43 (1.09) -1.52 (.60) -1.06 (.77) -3.54 (1.51) 
 NASDAQ level .002 (.003) .003 (.003) .0004 (.0037) .00 (.00) 
 Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) 47.54 (17.74) -.90 (.68) 49.17 (19.03) -.97 (.80) 
 Indicators for LP location by state Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Fund stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 












 Pseudo LR ratio -30,407 -30,719 -16,976 -17.161 
 p-value of Wald test .000 .333 .000 .378 
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Table 12 – Summary of Executive Profiles in Money Management Firms, 2004 
This table compares the profiles of executives in a random sample of 706 money management firms, out of over 1,700 in 
the full set in Nelson Information’s Investment Managers.  Data such as age, experience and “years with firm” are in years. 
 
 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
All in dataset      
Private equity or VC firms? 706 10%    
FOF firm? 706 3%    
Age (median among executives) 597 48.9 8.0 27 74 
Experience (median) 685 22.4 7.3 2 50 
Years with firm (median) 692 9.2 7.0 1 35.5 
Age (max among executives) 597 60.7 9.6 27 90 
Experience (max) 685 35.5 8.7 2 74 
Years with firm (max) 692 18.3 12.1 1 58 
Within private equity and VC firms      
FOF firms? 68 34%    
Age (median among executives) 45 48.0 5.0 33 61 
Experience (median) 54 20.6 5.0 7.5 32 
Years with firm (median) 57 7.0 5.3 1 20 
Age (max among executives) 45 57.6 8.1 41 73 
Experience (max) 54 32.3 8.1 15 49 
Years with firm (max) 57 15.7 10.4 1 42 
Within private equity and VC FOFs      
Age (median among executives) 18 46.8 6.0 33 61 
Experience (median) 23 20.5 5.0 7.5 32 
Years with firm (median) 23 7.2 4.4 1 14 
Age (max among executives) 18 55.9 8.7 41 73 
Experience (max) 23 31.7 8.7 15 49 
Years with firm (max) 23 15.4 7.6 4 32 
 
Table 13 – Test of Equality of Means of Executive Experience and Age 
This table does a t-test to see whether the means from the data in Table 12 are significantly different. 
 t p-value 
Between those in FOFs and other money managers (private equity/VC or not)   
Age (median among executives) 1.113 .266 
Experience (median) 1.308 .191 
Years with firm (median) 1.403 .161 
Age (max among executives) 2.144 .032 
Experience (max) 2.184 .029 
Years with firm (max) 1.156 .248 
Between those in FOFs and other private equity/VC   
Age (median among executives) 1.306 .199 
Experience (median) 0.081 .936 
Years with firm (median) -0.182 .856 
Age (max among executives) 1.151 .256 
Experience (max) 0.501 .619 
Years with firm (max) 0.163 .871 
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Table 14 – Summary of Differences in Access 
In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of the non-FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using 
LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger 
than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-
using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on LPs’ using them.  Each cell shows “access” achieved by 
the LP (either directly or via FOFs).  It is measured by (the negative of) lateness, which is the year an LP gets into a fund 
minus the year the fund is started.  Therefore, the smaller the number (less late), the better the access. 
* The cut-off in absolute access is to ensure that the lateness/earliness figures do not become so big that they represent 
most likely long-term open-ended funds rather than close-end ones. 
 
 
  Cut-off in absolute access* 
 All 10 years 5 years 3 years 
User-non-user comparison     














t statistic -0.94 -5.61 -3.29 -2.78 
p-value .347 .000 .001 .0055 
Intra-user comparison     














t statistic 20.19 28.83 13.66 8.78 





Table 15 – Effect of Access on Performance 
This table uses IRR as the dependant variable.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of the non-
FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance 
generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance 
of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on LPs’ using them.  
Access is measured by (the negative of) lateness, which is the year an LP gets into a fund minus the year the fund is 
started.  Therefore, the smaller the number, the better access. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
* The absolute access difference limit is to ensure that the lateness/earliness figures do not become so big that they 
represent most likely long-term open-ended funds rather than close-end ones. 
 
 User-non-user  Intra-user  
Dependant var: IRR for LP-fund pairs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indicator for FOF user .18 (.76) 3.35 (1.96)   
Indicator for FOF fund   -3.62 (5.94) 22.09 (3.07) 
Lateness*  1.66 (.24)  2.03 (.26) 
Lateness x log(fund size)  -.20 (.04)  -.24 (.04) 
LP vintage -.07 (.06) .25 (.09) -.09 (.03) .09 (.11) 
LP and GP in same state .27 (1.27) .69 (.95) -1.45 (.93) -.79 (1.91) 
NASDAQ level .0009 (.0036) .01 (.02) .003 (.005) .01 (.01) 
Log(LP size) 1.04 (.63) 1.74 (1.24) 1.00 (.35) .76 (.37) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) 47.51 (17.99) 56.13 (23.26) 48.64 (18.91) 56.76 (22.53) 
Indicators for LP location by state Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Pseudo LR ratio -30,446 -15,394 -17,275 -11,586 




Table 16 – Test of Diversification as a Motive for Using FOFs 
This table shows whether a measure of diversification is correlated with the use of funds of funds (FOFs) and other explanatory variables.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare 
the performance of the non-FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance generated by their FOF portfolios) 
are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value 
condition on LPs’ using them.  The “before and after FOF” test uses an indicator variable to undertake an event study. 








Dependant var (total 
per LP, logs taken) 
Funds PCs Funds PCs Funds PCs Funds PCs PCs PCs 
 (1) (2) (1a) (2a) (3) (4) (3a) (4a) (5) (6) 










    
Indicator for FOF user x 







    
Indicator for FOF user x 







    
Indicator for FOF fund 
  









Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(LP size)   







Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(fund size)   







Indicator for after-event 
FOF use   
   
 




Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(fund size)   
   
 
   1.48 
(.32) 
LP location by state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Fund stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Investment scope FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Events FE No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
N 6,762 5,881 6,762 5,881 3,843 3,346 3,740 3,251 253 250 
Adjusted R2 56.9% 33.2% 58.2% 33.3% 37.8% 33.0% 52.5% 33.1% 2.7% 0.6% 





Table 17 – Test of the Sub-scale Explanation 
This table looks at whether LPs use FOFs to (successfully) overcome sub-scale operations.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless 
otherwise stated. “PC” = portfolio company. 
 
(a) Do FOFs Deliver Value to Subscale (small) LPs? 







Indicator for FOF-usage 5.46 (3.12) 8.19 (4.00) 5.13 (3.20) 7.73 (4.00) 
Log(LP size) 2.00 (1.18) .12 (.39) 1.43 (.36) .11 (.39) 
FOF-usage x log(LP size) -.18 (.42) -1.11 (1.85) -.20 (.43) -1.08 (.51) 
Log(fund size)  .13 (1.85)  .22 (1.85) 
Log(fund size)2  -.46 (.15)  -.46 (.15) 
LP vintage  -.10 (.08)  -.16 (.08) 
LP and GP in same state  -1.63 (1.49)  -1.52 (1.49) 
NASDAQ level  -.0047 (.0015)  -.0048 (.0014) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) 49.2 (18.2) -2.68 (.55)  -2.44 (.56) 
Indicators for LP location by state No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 













Pseudo LR ratio -34,669 -31,975 -36,937 -31,956 
p-value of Wald test .0001 .0001 .000 .378 
 
(b) Are Agency Effects Present? 
 Dependant var: Reinvest in next fund, 
conditional on a next fund? 
Num of PCs in 
fund 
Log (ave round 
amount) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 IRR .0017 (.0010) .10 (.15)   
 Indicator for FOF-using LP .31 (.06) .31 (.06)   
 Indicator for FOF fund -4.46 (.29) -4.27 (.21) 9.30 (3.67) -.87 (.22) 
 Interaction of above two 3.98 (.23) 4.17 (.18)   
Indicator for FOF-using LP  -.022 (.008)   





Interaction of above two  -.001 (.005)   
 Log (fund size) .23 (.16) .25 (.17) 4.13 (.74) .39 (.02) 
 Log (fund size) 2 -.019 (.016) -.021 (.016)   
 LP vintage -.0009 (.0039) -.0002 (.0042)   
 LP and GP in same state .013 (.082) -.004 (.086)   
 NASDAQ .0022 (.0002) .002 (.0002) .001 (.002) .0001 (.0002) 
 Log (LP size) .06 (.01) .06 (.02)   
 Indicators for LP location by state Yes Yes   
 Indicators for LP type Yes Yes   
 Interaction of IRR with all above? No Yes   
 Indicators for fund location by state   Yes Yes 
 Fund sequence number   .33 (.11) .008 (.010) 
 Fund vintage   -.20 (.10) -.01 (.01) 
 Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) .59 (1.00) .74 (1.02)   
 Cluster by GP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Fund stage FE Yes Yes No No 
 Investment scope FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 N 3,584 3,584 1.823 1,794 
 Pseudo R2 24.9% 25.4% 35.7% 56.3% 
 p-value of Wald test .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Table 18 – Test of the Downward Scaling Explanation 
This table shows the results of a test of whether large LPs face a trade-off in downward scaling, which is to push out large volumes of 
investments over a short period of time.  The trade-off is between spreading investment over many  FOFs and risking coordination 
problems among them, versus not staging investments in one FOF and risking getting held up.  “Staging” is measured by the dependant 
variable, which is the maximum sequence number among the funds run by a GP for an LP.  “Spreading out” is measured by the number 
of FOFs by an LP.  “Captive FOFs” are those organized by GPs for single LPs. 
 
Dependant var: Max sequence number 
for GP’s funds 
Number of FOFs by LP -1.13 
(.078) 
Number of non-FOFs by LP .076 
(.0007) 
NASDAQ Index -.0006 
(.0005) 
Average excess IRR for sequence of funds by this GP -.06 
(.020) 
Captive FOFs? .14 
(.0003) 
Log (amount LP allocates to private equity) .58 
(.11) 
Log (amount LP allocates to FOFs) -.51 
(.21) 
Indicators for LP location by state Yes 
Indicators for LP state Yes 
Indicators for LP vintage Yes 
Cluster by LP Yes 
N 92 
Pseudo R2 45.5% 
p-value of Wald test .000 
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Table 19 – Test of the Governance Explanation 
This table shows whether the use of funds of funds (FOFs) can be explained by different types of LPs, which have different governance 
structures. 
 
Dependant var: FOF-usage 
Indicators for LP type (based=consultants)  
Educational Institutions 1.37 
 (.96) 








Non Financial Corporations 1.12 
 (.84) 
Other Non Profits 1.17 
 (.81) 
LP vintage -.001 
 (.012) 
Log (LP size) .22 
 (.06) 
Allocation of private equity .00049 
 (.00885) 
NASDAQ level .0017 
 (.0059) 
Indicators for LP location by state No 
Year FE No 
N 7,930 
Pseudo R2 21.2% 
p-value of Wald test .000 
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Table 20 – Test of the Learning Explanation 
In panel (a), I test for whether FOF usage can be explained by young LPs or LPs venturing into new areas.  The latter is measured by 
an indicator on whether the LP is a first-timer into new investment areas for a particular LP-year observation.  Model (1) uses probit 
estimation.  Model (2) uses SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) estimation.  Other controls include log(LP size), log(fund size), LP 
vintage, whether LP and GP are in the same state, NASDAQ level. 
 
In panel (b), I test whether allocation to private equity without using FOFs changes with the duration of the experience with FOFs and 
the performance of that FOF experience.  Other controls include log(LP size), LP vintage, NASDAQ level. 
 






Usage of FOF by investment scope 
  Mixed Buyout Focused VC 










Indicator for being first-timer 
 All types 
-.74 









































Other controls* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP location by state Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,917 9,222 9,222 9,222 9,222 
Pseudo R2 38.6% 49.8% 42.0% 20.5% 38.5% 
p-value of Wald test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
 
(b) Learning or Outsourcing? 
 Experience with which type of FOFs? 




























Other controls* Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP location by state Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LP FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 899 899 291 138 
R2 27.0% 27.2% 84.9% 52.4% 
p-value of Wald test .02 .61 .01 .00 
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Figure 1 – FOF Usage and Investments in FOFs 
















For FOFusers, how do their FOF investments do 
versus their non-FOF investments?
∂ IRR /  ∂ FOFfund |FOFuser=1 = (α+β+γ) – α = β+γ
User-non-user comparison:
How do FOF users do versus non-users in 
selecting non-FOF (regular) funds?




(b) Mapping Above to a Simplifying Picture 
 
FOF-users Non-usersLPs:
Funds: FOFs Regular Regular



















FOF users: how 




User-non-user comparison - 
How much do FOF-users 
outperform non-users in picking 











Note that “Non-financial corp” and “Foundations,” indicated by triangles rather than circles, do not have coefficients for the interaction 
with FOFusagexFOFfund due to collinearity, and the placement in the plot above assumes a zero coefficient.  The plot might be better 
considered without these two, but I place them here for completeness. 
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Figure 5 – Performance versus Learning 
Short-term orientation
(learning)
Good returns → positive 
learning experience, 
reduce out-sourcing
Poor returns → negative experience 
(try another FOF, or quit this area)
Long-term orientation
(performance)
Poor returns → in-house
Good returns → out-source
LP experience 




to new area 
(% total 
commit)
Poor FOF returns; 
manage in-house
Good FOF returns; 
out-source
Performance story Learning story
 
